Determinants and Effects of Changes in the Stock of Money, 1875-1960 by Philip Cagan
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Determinants and Effects of Changes in the Stock of Money,
1875-1960






Chapter Author: Philip Cagan
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c1646
Chapter pages in book: (p. 279 - 298)7
SUMMARY
THE GENERAL PROPOSITION that the stock of money depends on the
behavior of the institutions that issue money and their interrelations
with the rest of the economy would receive wide agreement. Beyond
that, however, current theories treat monetary relationships with
considerable variety, reflecting the paucity and ambiguity of the
evidence. New data recently made available and supplemented here
allow further examination of the record.This study has aimed at
providing a broad historical analysis of monetary behavior as necessary
background for further work.Many short periods have special
features which such an analysis helps to place in perspective.\'Vithin
this over-all objective the study was directed toward three specific tasks:
1. To describe the secular and cyclical movements in the money
stock and identify the institutional channels through which they
occurred.
2. To look beyond these channels, as far as is possible in a broad
study, to analyze the underlying factors and relationships at work.
3. To use the findings of supply factors to clarify monetary effects
on prices and output.
The analysis was facilitated by distinguishing the actions of the
federal government, commercial banks, and the public. The govern-
ment (including Federal Reserve Banks) is responsible for the issue
of money that can serve as bank reserves, called high-powered money.
During the period studied, high-powered money outstanding has
consisted, at different times, of currency and gold outside the Treasury
and Federal Reserve Banks, deposits of banks at Federal Reserve
Banks, and national bank notes outside issuing banks. The amount
outstanding is held by both the public and banks. Its division between
them is jointly determined by two ratios: the fraction of total money
balances the public holds in the form of currency instead of bank
deposits—the currency-money ratio—and thequantity of high-
powered reserves held by banks per dollar of total deposits held by the280 SUMMARY
public—the reserve ratio. A simple formula allocates changes in the
money stock to the part contributed by each of the three proximate
determinants—high-powered money outstanding, and the two ratios.
The money stock increases with an increase in high-powered money
or with a decline in either of the two ratios.
A change in the money stock may be attributed to the sum of the
three contributions so long as they are largely independent. Lack of
independence would mean there were causal connections between the
determinants or constraints on movements in the total money stock.
Evidence was found of a partial dependence of high-powered money
on the two ratios, attributable partly to the common effects of business
cycles and partly to a constraint on the money stock produced by the
gold-standard mechanism in the long run and Federal Reserve op-
erations in the short run.Such interdependence was confined to
effects on high-powered money and does not preclude a general
analysis of the factors affecting each determinant.
This summary chapter brings together the major findings on the
above three topics. The evidence for long and short movements is
discussed separately because the factors affecting the determinants
differed according to the time span.
1.SecularMovements
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THREE DETERMINANTS
TO GROWTH IN THE MONEY STOCK
The money stock as defined here—currency outside banks plus de-
mand and time deposits at commercial banks—grew from 1875 to
1955 at an average annual rate of nearly 6 per cent, though with
considerable variation. Nine-tenths of the secular growth of the money
stock over the whole period was accounted for by the expansion
of high-powered money, and the remaining one-tenth by declines in
the currency and reserve ratios.These fractions were virtually the
same after excluding the two world war periods. Most of the decline
in the ratios occurred before World War I, so that high-powered money
has been relatively more important in the period since then. Growth
of this determinant has tended in the very long run to follow the growth
of the total domestic gold stock.While the ratio of high-poweredSUMMARY 281
money to the total domestic gold stock has varied considerably in the
short run, it was about the same in 1955 as in the 1880's (after the large
increase in the gold stock which followed the resumption of specie
payments in 1879). The money stock grew somewhat faster than the
gold stock over the period as a which is attributable entirely to
the substitution of checking accounts for currency and to a decline in
the reserve ratio of the banking system.
FACTORS AFFECTING THE THREE DETERMINANTS
High-Powered Money. Movements in high-powered money may be
traced (1) to changes in the gold stock, (2) to Federal Reserve System
operations, as indicated by changes in its monetary liabilities or,
equivalently, in its credit outstanding, (3) to Treasury operations, and
(4) to issues of national bank notes. This classification has the ad-
vantage of centering attention on the principal sources of change in
high-powered money rather than on the particular kinds of money
issued. An increase in the gold stock, for example, if not offset by
Treasury or Federal Reserve operations, expands high-powered money
through an addition to bank reserves or to currency in circulation,
though gold itself no longer circulates and is not today a part of high-
powered money outstanding.
Secular changes in high-powered money can be attributed largely
to the gold stock and, after 1914, in about equal measure also to
Federal Reserve operations.The latter played a conspicuous role
chiefly in the rapid expansion of the money stock during the two
world wars. A greater rate of growth of the money stock after 1896
reflected increased growth of the gold stock, stemming in turn from a
gradual expansion of world gold production beginning in the late
1880's.Treasury operations and issues of national bank notes have
been of minor importance as sources of change in high-powered money,
particularly since World War I.
The Currency-A'Ioney Ratio. Currency in circulation exceeds amounts
needed for retail transactions, and apparently serves also as a store of
wealth. The amount demanded therefore depends not only on trans-
action uses affected by the volume of consumer expenditures and the
cost of a checking account but also on wealth holdings affected by
total private wealth and interest rates paid on substitutes—mainly
savings deposits. The ratio of currency to total money holdings depends282 SUMMARY
upon how the relevant demand factors affect currency and commercial
bank deposits differently.
There was a secular decline in the currency-money ratio from at
least the l870's to 1930, which reflected decreasing relative demands
for currency and rising relative demands for commercial bank deposits.
Savings deposit rates generally fell during this period and so do not
explain these demand changes, though the rates began to rise after
the turn of the century and so may account for an accelerated decline
in currency demand after about 1904. A variety of institutional
developments in payment and saving practices accompanied the secular
shift in demand from currency to deposits, for which the growth in
real income and of urban centers provides a satisfactory summary
explanation.
None of the aforementioned factors explains the wartime increase
in currency demand, attributed here to changes of residence by workers,
hoarding of U.S. currency abroad, and income-tax evasion.Since
income-tax rates remained high after the war, currency holdings used
for evading taxes have also remained high. The decline in currency
demand since 1945 must therefore be attributed to the disappearance
of the other wartime factors and to rising savings deposit rates during
the 1950's. By 1960 the ratio of currency to consumer expenditures
stood at about the same level as in 1939, but still considerably higher
than in 1929. The explanation appears to involve a combination of
partly offsetting factors. Tax evasion has added to currency demand
since the early 1940's, and service charges on checking accounts,
first imposed in the l930's, have been increasing slowly since the mid-
1940's.Rising savings deposit rates since the war have reduced
currency demand, however, though they were still lower in 1960 than
in the 1920's.
The increasing demand for commercial bank deposits (relative to
national income) during the 1930's and 1940's and declining demand
during the 1950's partly offset the movements in currency demand.
Hence the currency-money ratio follows the movements in the cur-
rency-expenditures ratio since the 1 930's, but with less amplitude.
The Reserve Ratio. The reserve ratio can be analyzed in terms of the
required and the usable reserve ratios. The former shows changes in
reserve requirements, which have been important mainly in certain
short-run periods. The usable ratio represents reserves in excess ofSUMMARY 283
requirements and appears normally to be independent of the required
ratio; that is, changes in the latter are usually fully transmitted to the
total ratio, though the adjustment occurs with varying speeds. Over
all, the required ratio has not changed greatly. Nor have shifts in the
distribution of deposits among banks and between time and demand
accounts affected the ratio greatly. The secular decline in the total
reserve ratio reflects mainly a decline in the usable ratio. Most of the
decline came before the founding of the Federal Reserve Banks and
can be attributed to actions taken by the Treasury after about 1900
to assist banks and stabilize the money market. The Federal Reserve
Act of a decade later formalized the government's role in these ac-
tivities and induced a further, though much smaller, decline in the
usable ratio.It rose temporarily in the 1930's but during World War
II it came down again and by 1955 had fallen low enough almost to
preclude further decline.
Since long-term interest rates started to rise shortly before 1900,
it is tempting to explain the concurrent secular decline in the ratio by
the inverse effect of interest-rate movements. But long-term rates were
falling in the 1870's and 1880's, when the trend of the ratio was cer-
tainly not upward. Consequently, a long-run effect of this kind appears
inconsistent with the behavior of the ratio.
To sum up, the long-run growth of the money stock reflects pri-
marily growth of the world and domestic gold stocks and, since 1914,
also of Federal Reserve credit outstanding.Secondarily, it reflects a
decline in the reserve ratio since about 1900, owing to a more stable
money market; and a decline in the currency ratio from at least the
1870's until1930, owing to the gradual substitution of checking
accounts for currency with the rise in real income.
EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN THE MONEY
STOCK ON PRICES AND OUTPUT
Secular movements in money and prices, measured by their rates
of change between average reference cycle standings centered at
reference peaks, have a very high positive covariation, higher than can
be reconciled with the view that these movements are largely un-
related.Traditional theories of monetary disturbances can be inter-
preted as indicating that an important line of influence runs from
money, on the one side, to prices and output, on the other. Another284 SUMMARY
view is that the high covariation reflects a direction of influence
running primarily the other way, from prices and output to money.
This study's examination of the determinants of the money stock helps
to clarify the main direction of influence by showing to what extent
prices and output affect the money stock and so can account for the
high covariation observed. Since we find that secular variations in the
rate of change in the money stock are largely due to high-powered
money, effects of prices on money can account for the covariation only
insofar as they occur through this determinant. Yet price changes
have little effect on the nongold components of high-powered money,
and the effect of prices on the gold stock is inverse. Hence, the positive
covariation between money and prices cannot reflect the second
direction of influence and must reflect the first, the effect of money
on prices.
The evidence can be summarized in terms of correlation coefficients.
The secular rate of change in prices for 18 intercyclical subperiods
from 1877 to 1954 was correlated more closely with the rate of growth
of the money stock than with the contributions to that growth of any
of the three determinants. This supports the hypothesis that money-
stock changes produced the changes in prices.Moreover, the im-
plications of the alternative hypothesis, that the direction of influence
ran from prices to money, are contradicted in two ways:(1) The
secular rates of change in prices and in the gold stock were, in fact,
correlated positively, not negatively, as the alternative hypothesis
requires.(2) Price movements had a substantially lower correlation
with all the nongold sources of change in the money stock, singly or in
combination, than with changes in the total money stock.
These results do not mean that prices had no effects on the deter-
minants, but only that the effects were not in the right direction or of
sufficient importance to account for the high positive correlation with
the money stock. The effect on the gold stock, as noted, should be
inverse:inflation in gold-standard countries, which lowers the com-
modity value of gold, discourages its production and so reduces the
rate of growth of the world gold stock;in addition, inflation in one
country makes its prices higher relative to prices in other countries and
leads to outflow of gold.Deflation has the converse effects.These
adjustments, of course, take time.If they occurred immediately,
price changes would set up countermovements at once in the gold andSUMMARY 285
money stocks, and could not go far. Though the data show the lags to
be quite long, the relationship accords with the traditional theory of a
commodity standard: a rise in the money stock, for example, raises
prices;this, in turn, tends eventually to reduce gold production and
the annual growth of the world gold stock, thereby holding back the
growth of money stocks of countries on the gold standard and counter-
acting the initial rise. The relatively more rapid effect of money-stock
changes on prices, compared with the lagged effect of prices on the
gold stock, accounts for the observed positive correlation of concurrent
movements in prices and gold.
Apart from gold, the components of high-powered money are not
greatly affected by price changes. Government actions have to some
extent produced a weak inverse effect, because silver purchases and
Federal Reserve credit outstanding have been used to offset some
price movements. That these components nevertheless tend to have a
positive secular correlation with prices may be attributed to their
effect on prices through the money stock.Price effects on the two
ratios also appear negligible; since high-powered money is by far the
most important determinant of secular movements, however, the two
ratios can be ignored.
Notwithstanding these results for the period as a whole, the results
for the subperiod 1919—54 are not on the surface inconsistent with
the alternative hypothesis that price changes produced the secular
movements in the money series.For that period, prices had just as
close a correlation with the nongold components of high-powered
money as they had with the money stock, and also had a slight negative
correlation with the gold stock. The latter result reflects primarily
the large rise in the gold stock in the 1920's, when prices were relatively
constant, and the large rise in the 1930's following the devaluation of
the dollar, when prices barely made up for ground lost in the early
1930's and, by our measure of the secular rate of change, did not
advance. Federal Reserve credit outstanding, rather than gold, has
largely determined the secular movements in the money stock since
1914. That is why prices were correlated highly, not only with the
money stock but also with an important source of change in high-
powered money, Federal Reserve credit outstanding. These results
do not, however, establish the alternative hypothesis for that sub-
period. To do that would also require evidence that the effects of286 SUMMARY
money on prices found for the pre-1914 period somehow no longer
occurred thereafter, and that price changes had a strong positive
effect on Federal Reserve credit outstanding. Neither proposition is
credible.Federal Reserve policies were often intended to counteract
price movements, not to reinforce them. The correlation coefficients
for 1919—54 are also consistent with the first hypothesis and can be
interpreted as reflecting the new importance of Federal Reserve credit
on money-stock changes, and thence on prices.
The present findings suggest that long-run changes in the money
stock produce corresponding, very likely proportional, changes in
prices relative to what they would otherwise be. Recent theoretical
work also supports these suggested links, but many writers have not
been persuaded because of doubts about the empirical evidence.
Our data dispel the basis for most of these doubts, at least for the
period covered.Nonmonetary factors also affect prices, of course,
through changes in the velocity of money. Prices do not remain in
fixed ratio to the money stock, as a "crude" quantity theory is supposed
to assert.Nevertheless, changes in the velocity of money were rel-
atively unimportant in secular movements, as indicated by the high
correlation found between the rates of change of money and prices.
To explain secular movements in prices, therefore, we should look
primarily to the money stock, and then secondarily to nonmonetary
factors that may also have important influence. Changes in the money
stock may, of course, reflect many different factors which, in these
days of thoroughly managed monetary systems, have widely different
origins. We have come a long way from a primitive commodity
currency; this study indicates how varied the sources of change in the
money stock have become.
Secular price movements may be related to long cycles in aggregate
output and productivity, as suggested by similar movements in such
series and in price indexes.Insofar as these movements are in fact
related, our findings suggest that the direction of influence runs
primarily from money to prices, then to output, because no evidence
was found that prices and output systematically affect the money
stock and come first in the chain of influence. The further question
presents itself: how money and prices affect output in the long run.
Some leading possibilities were reviewed, but tests of their validity are
still to be made.SUMMARY 287
2. Cyclical Movements
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THREE DETERMINANTS
TO CYCLES IN MONETARY GROWTH
There were 18 short-run cycles corresponding to business cycles
in the rate of monetary growth from 1877 to 1954.(The few non-
corresponding movements are noted in Chapter 1.)The currency
ratio was the proximate source of half the variation in the rate of
monetary growth during those 18 cycles. High-powered money and
the reserve ratio were each responsible for about a quarter of the over-
all variation. The relative contributions to the two war cycles were
different, but excluding them does not affect the general picture.
The important role of the currency ratio reflects two factors: the com-
paratively large amplitude of its fluctuations, and the regularity of its
cyclical pattern. High-powered money showed fluctuations nearly as
large, but they were erratic and frequently contrary to movements in
the ratios;hence, the average relative contribution of this deter-
minant was quite low. The reserve ratio over the period as a whole
had the greatest cyclical regularity in absolute terms, but, since it
also had a small amplitude, its net influence on cycles in the rate of
monetary growth was lower than that of the currency ratio.
While displaying considerable diversity, the individual cycles reveal
common patterns. The peak in the monetary growth rate typically
comes during the first part of business expansions.The ensuing
decline in the rate during this phase reflects decreasing contributions
from the currency and reserve ratios, primarily the former.(Since
the two ratios each contribute inversely to the rate of change in the
money stock, our description of their contribution takes account of
this. The ratios themselves move in the opposite direction to the way
their contributions are described.During business expansions, for
example, the ratios generally decline at a gradually diminishing rate.
This means that they make a diminishing positive contribution to the
rate of change in the money stock as the expansion proceeds, and
hence account for the decline in the rate.)
High-powered money behaves irregularly during businessex-
pansions, but, more often than not, its growth rate at first expands
and then subsides during this phase. On net, the rate of change in the
money stock falls steadily until there is a peak in business activity, or288 SUMMARY
somewhat later. Then monetary growth begins to rise, reflecting an
upturn in the contribution of the currency ratio and irregular con-
tributions by the other two determinants that tend to cancel each other.
Although the growth rate of high-powered money has often declined
substantially during the last part of business contractions, sometimes
the decline merely offset large changes in reserve requirements.
Apart from such changes, the reserve ratio has no consistent pattern
over business contractions. These divergent movements of the three
determinants have nearly always raised the growth rate of the money
stock during business contractions as a whole, but not steadily.
Sometimes the rise in the rate has faltered in the final stages of
business contractions, and sometimes it has accelerated. The cycles in
money can be attributed to all three determinants, though most
consistently for the entire period to the currency ratio, and for the
later period more so to high-powered money than to the reserve
ratio.
In a comparison of the periods before and after World War I, the
relative contribution of the currency ratio to cycles in monetary
growth was about the same. The relative contribution of the reserve
ratio was much lower in the later period, chiefly because of a reduction
in its amplitude of fluctuation. The reduction began earlier than
World War I—around 1900—in response to a new willingness and
ability of the Treasury to alleviate financial stringencies in the money
market. The Federal Reserve took over this function and, except for
the 1930's, has made it possible for banks to operate at all stages of the
cycle with reserves barely above minimum requirements. The am-
plitude of cycles in monetary growth was still larger in the later period,
however, owing to the increased amplitude of fluctuations in high-
powered money produced by Federal Reserve credit outstanding,
which more than compensated for the smaller fluctuations in the
reserve ratio.
Although there was a striking difference between the sources of
monetary change in business cycles before and after World War I,
there was little difference between mild and severe cycles. When the
cycles in monetary growth were classified according to the amplitude
of the corresponding contractions in business activity, the relative
contributions of the determinants were roughly the same.The
contributionsfluctuatedwithlargeramplitudeinthosecyclesSUMMARY 289
corresponding to the six most severe business contractions, but with
about the same relative importance and essentially the same patterns
as in mild cycles.Apparently, financial panics, which have accom-
panied most of the six severe cycles, intensify but do not alter the
pattern of cycles in monetary variables.
These findings need qualification insofar as the relative contributions
of the determinants offset each other.Occasional offsets will occur
by accident, but, if persistent, they suggest that the determinants are
behaviorally related. To that extent the determinants are not in-
dependent, and changes in the money stock cannot be meaningfully
attributed to the sum of their three contributions.It makes more
sense, then, to count as contributions just those movements in each
determinant that are not offset by related movements in the other two.
The extent to which the determinants are related to each other is not
easy to establish, but intercorrelations of their cyclical movements
provide some evidence.
There is no correlation between cycles in the currency and reserve
ratios.High-powered money, however, has considerable correlation
with the combined contribution of the two ratios. The correlation is
highest in the post-World War I cycles, from mid-expansion to the
first stage of contraction of those cycles.For each of these stages
separately, correlating among cycles, the contribution of high-powered
money tends to be lower when that of the two ratios is higher, and
conversely. The correlation reflects either unrelated parallel responses
to business cycles, or a direct relation produced by Federal Reserve
operations on high-powered money to offset certain movements in the
two ratios.
The offsetting movements generally worked to lower the relative
contribution of high-powered money, by the measure used, and to
raise that of the two ratios. The measure can be adjusted to remove
the main influence of offsetting movements. For the earlier cycles,
the adjustment raises the relative contribution of high-powered money,
though the two ratios still appear to be the major contributors by a
small margin. In the later cycles, high-powered money becomes the
major contributor. The adjustment is imprecise and probably over-
states the relative contribution of high-powered money, but it in-
dicates in a general way how a correction for intercorrelation affects
the findings.290 SUMMARY
FACTORS AFFECTING THE THREE DETERMINANTS
High-Powered Money. Few of the findings of this study concerning
secular movements help to identify the sources of short-run cycles in
the money series.Cyclical movements are not only more erratic than
the secular but also seem to depend on a separate set of factors, which
for the most part are of little significance over long periods. The
difficulties are most severe for high-powered money, partly because
of our inability to disentangle foreign and domestic influences on gold
flows, partly because Treasury and Federal Reserve operations reflect
a hard-to-separate mixture of deliberate policy and passive response
to market developments.
For the pre-1914 period, cyclical changes in high-powered money
reflected gold flows and the nongold sources about equally. One of
the important elements in gold flows, the balance of foreign commodity
trade, generally moved inversely to domestic business activity, con-
tributing to like fluctuations in gold flows. This reflected conforming
behavior of U.S. commodity imports to business activity and in part
also inverse behavior of U.S. exports. Exports usually had a trough
about the time general business reached a peak, though their pattern
in other stages shows considerable diversity among cycles.Business
activity in foreign countries affected the demand for U.S. exports
irregularly relative to the timing of U.S. business cycles.
In general, cyclical changes in high-powered money before 1914
followed the inverse pattern of the trade balance in part only, because
the other sources of change in the gold stock—changes in domestic
gold production, in the service balance, and in capital movements
—offset the trade balance. Presumably, short-term capital movements
provided most of the offset;the other items would not ordinarily
respond much to cyclical developments. On this evidence, therefore,
capital movements had a stabilizing influence on gold flows in the
period, thus apparently reducing—though not eliminating—the do-
mestic monetary effects of foreign trade. The question remains open
whether those effects moderated or reinforced U.S. business cycles.
After 1914, cyclical changes in high-powered money reflected
primarily the nongold sources—mainly Treasury and Federal Reserve
operations—despite the large gold inflows during the first half of the
1920's and throughout the 1930's. The nongold sources were largelySUMMARY 291
responsible for the irregular cyclical behavior of this determinant.
Treasury operations had a cyclical impact—generally slight—through
silver-purchase programs mainly in the 1890's, through temporary
relief to banks in tight-money periods of the early 1900's, and through
gold sterilization in the 1930's.Federal Reserve loans to banks and
open-market operations were important in all the post-1914 cycles
except the second half of the 1930's. Their loans to banks had a positive
conformity to reference cycles, presumably because the incentive of
banks to borrow varied with market interest rates. These loans have
diminished in relative amount and no longer introduce, as they did
in the l920's, a slight direct dependence of the money stock on market
credit demands and interest rates.Notwithstanding the declining
importance of those loans, total Federal Reserve credit outstanding
materially altered the cyclical pattern of high-powered money from
what it had been before 1914.
So far as can be judged from the post-World War I business cycle
patterns of the nongold sources, the Reserve Banks did not follow a
uniform cyclical policy. This is true even if we exclude their-loans to
banks. Their behavior was governed rather by a variety of policies.
Sometimes their actions supported inflation, as in the First World
War, and sometimes deflation, as in 1921, or imposed restraint in a
buoyant business climate, as in 1928—29, or sometimes were not
motivated by cyclical developments, as in the bond-support program
during and after World War II. The objectives of policy preclude
simple classification at other times, as when open-market operations
were countercyclical in over-all pattern but insufficient to reverse
the forces carrying the money stock the other way; the 1929—33 con-
traction is an example. The variety of cyclical patterns discourages
generalizing about Federal Reserve actions as simply "active" or
"passive," responsive to the needs of trade or countercyclical.
In general, of course, the Federal Reserve has not viewed a particular
growth rate of the money stock as the sole, or even the most important,
goal of its actions. We should not expect to find a perfect or uniform
offset. The period examined was colored by three particularly severe
cycles in the interwar period which, together with the two world wars,
account for the largest fluctuations in the series during the post-1914
period.Since World War II, the money stock has been unusually
stable, by past standards, even allowing for the absence of severe cycles.292 SUMMARY
The Reserve Ratio. Most cyclical fluctuations in the reserve ratio
may be traced to the usable reserve ratio and so reveal bank preferences
with respect to their cash balances. We have seen how government
actions to stabilize the money market have reduced the average level
of the usable reserve ratio since about 1900; at the same time, the
amplitude of its fluctuations has also declined. There has always been,
and still is, a tendency for the usable ratio to rise when general business
contracts and to fall when business improves, though in mild con-
tractions the amount of rise has been small, particularly since 1914.
On the other hand, when panics developed, as in most severe cycles,
the reserve ratio rose steeply and continued rising for some time there-
after.Following such episodes, banks naturally sought safety in
plentiful reserves until all traces of panic disappeared.
In mild cycles, fluctuations in the ratio have been widely attributed
to the effect of interest rates, but the evidence justifies skepticism. Our
analysis reveals no consistent relation between the size of changes in
interest rates and in the total reserve ratio. Often the timing of move-
ments in the two differed appreciably. Apparently, reserves become
uncomfortably low during business expansions and, when the demand
for loans slackens after a business peak, banks take the first opportunity
to augment their reserves. Although the effects of a decline in loan
demand and in rates are difficult to separate empirically, the analysis
here suggests that movements in the ratio conform in timing and
amplitude more closely to general business activity than to interest
rates, insofar as the two differ. The only discernible effect of interest
rates on the reserve ratio occurs indirectly: they influence the relative
proportion of time and demand deposits at banks and hence affect
required reserves.
The rise in the ratio in the first half of the l930's, often attributed
to the decline in interest rates and fall in loan demand, is better ex-
plained by the strain on bank solvency. By 1936, the usable ratio had
risen considerably, but not above levels common before 1914, when
there was no Federal Reserve System and banks had to rely on their
own reserves to weather financial storms.After the experience of
1931—33, member banks apparently chose to rely on adequate usable
reserves as a first line of defense. Accordingly, when reserve require-
ments were raised in 1936—37, member banks took steps to restore the
loss of usable reserves and increased the total reserve ratio between
1936 and 1938.This interpretation is supported by the concurrentSUMMARY 293
dissimilar behavior of other banking institutions and by the similar
response of member banks to increases in requirements at other times.
The common presumption that such increases have little effect on the
total reserve ratio finds no support.
The Currency Ratio. Although the government and banks are usually
the center of attention in monetary studies, the currency-money
ratio has been a far more consistent source of cycles in monetary
growth. It was as important as the reserve ratio before 1914, and has
been more important since—contrary to the popular assumption that
variations in bank reserves are the main source of monetary cycles.
One long-standing theory of cyclical movements in the currency ratio
relates the use of currency to the volume of retail trade.Cycles in
retail trade coincide with business cycles, however, and so cannot
explain the peculiar timing of movements in the currency ratio.
Midway through business expansions, it levels off from a long-run
downward trend.This behavior could be explained by a similar
pattern of the distribution of money holdings between consumers and
businesses, the currency ratio of each sector remaining the same:
since the consumer sector has the higher ratio, a shift in relative money
holdings to consumers would raise the aggregate currency ratio—and
conversely. In recent cycles—the only ones for which data on owner-
ship of the money stock are available—the distribution had the required
cyclical pattern part of the time, but the amplitude of fluctuation was
small enough to rule out this theory.
Another approach is to analyze cyclical movements in the currency-
money ratio in terms of the ratio of currency to consumer expenditures,
which the retail-trade theory implies is constant, but which apparently
is largely responsible for the leading turn in the currency-money
ratio. Use of currency per dollar of expenditures falls during reference
expansions—that is, the velocity of currency rises just as the velocity
of deposits does—but tends to level off midway through expansions.
Deposit rates seem unable to account for this behavior.Currency
demand apparently adjusts with a lag to changes in expenditures
and wealth.
THE INTERRELATION OF CYCLES IN
MONETARY GROWTH AND BUSINESS
If money-stock changes affect prices in the long run, they must do
so in the short run as well, but not necessarily to the same relative294 SUMMARY
extent.Changes in the velocity of money are relatively more im-
portant in short-run cycles, and we do not know how much of the
cyclical movements in prices and output, if any, would disappear if
money-stock changes were somehow eliminated. The rate of monetary
growth corresponds closely to cycles in business activity, but this might
result solely from the effect of activity on money.Although this
direction of influence was found unimportant for secular movements,
it appears to be iniportant for cyclical movements.
Short-run fluctuations in the three determinants appear to reflect
cycles in business activity.The currency ratio seems to fluctuate
because of differences in the cyclical behavior of the velocity of cur-
rency and of deposits, and the reserve ratio seems to fluctuate chiefly
because of cyclical movements in credit demands. The gold com-
ponent of high-powered money varies with both domestic and foreign
business cycles through its dependence on the balance of payments.
The nongold component—primarily Federal Reserve credit out-
standing—seems to react to cycles in general economic activity, though
not in any simple way which can be readily summarized.Interest
rates, however, appear to have very minor effects on the money
stock.
There could of course be other explanations for cycles in the deter-
minants that would carry radically different implications.Some
kind of interaction between financial institutions and capital markets
might generate cycles in the two ratios, unrelated to concurrent cycles
in commercial and industrial activity. For example, changes in the
money stock might temporarily alter the distribution of money holdings
and affect the currency ratio. But no evidence of such an interaction
was found.If business activity is responsible for the cycles in the
money series, itis difficult to assess the importance of the reverse
effects of those cycles on the economy.
There is one aspect of cycles in money, however, that seems to
originate in developments ether than the fluctuations in business
activity itself. Large declines in the rate of growth of the money stock
have occurred sporadically and for a variety of reasons, each largely
independent of the concurrent movement of business.Most of the
declines reflected sharp increases in the currency and reserve ratios
during and following panics.At such times the public rushed to
withdraw bank deposits before payment was suspended, and theSUMMARY 295
heavy loss of reserves threatened banks with failure. To save them-
selves, banks sometimes had to suspend payments. The currency
ratio as measured does not always exhibit the full effects of panics,
sometimes because banks suspended and no more currency could then
be withdrawn, often because currency flowed back to banks quickly
after the panic subsided, and the annual data miss the point of high
demand. Whether they suspended or not, banks contracted credit
sharply and, for some time afterwards, sought to build up their
reserves. The only exception to that response occurred in the panic
of 1914, precipitated by the outbreak of war in Europe, when banks
could issue unlimited amounts of emergency notes, thanks to the pro-
visions of the Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 1908.With that effective
defense, banks had no serious trouble handling the panic and did not
contract credit. Two other large declines in monetary growth—in
1921 and 1937—38—reflected special factors.In both, high-powered
money contracted sharply; and also, in 1937—38, the reserve ratio rose
in response to the 1936—37 increases in reserve requirements.
The evidence indicates that a severe contraction in business alone
will not produce extreme increases in the currency and reserve ratios—
certainly not so large as occurred in panics. Panics as a rule do not
reflect severe business contractions.Most panics have broken out
during the first part of business downturns, following a series of dra-
matic bankruptcies, before general business activity declined to low
depression levels.In the absence of a panic, business declines have
produced only mild changes in the currency and reserve ratios, and
that was true in one crucial instance, 1921, when the contraction in
business became severe.There are no unexplained exceptions to
this behavior. The two ratios did rise sharply well before the banking
holiday in 1933, but that reflected the near-panic conditions of 1930—32,
when banks were failing all over the country. The reserve ratio also
rose sharply in 1937—38, and first rose and then declined in 1948—49,
because of related changes in reserve requirements.
Severe depressions are, to be sure, relatively rare phenomena, and
we must draw our conclusions from only a small number of cycles.
Indeed, an important part of the evidence is the behavior of the two
ratios when business contracts severely but no panic occurs, and 1921
provides the only clear-cut case.It may be that the two ratios are not
normally so unresponsive to a severe business decline as they were in296 SUMMARY
1921. Even so, their response to panics seems exceptional. In mild
cycles, business declines appear actually to increase monetary growth.
In most severe cycles, the monetary upturn is considerably delayed
because of other special influences and apparently only in small part
because of the steepness of the business decline itself.
This evidence points to an important independent role of monetary
factors in severe business contractions. The six largest declines in
money were associated with severe depressions, and severe depressions
have never occurred otherwise. In the six most severe business con-
tractions since the l880's, the declines in monetary growth became
sharp generally before, and ended during, the contraction in business.
Since severe contractions in business alone do not appear to produce
an exceptionally large fall in monetary growth, the association of
amplitudes can only be explained by an effect of money on business.
Panics cannot be held solely responsible for the deep declines in both
money and business. Two severe business contractions had no panic;
in addition, some panics did not produce a large drop in monetary
growth, and the accompanying declines in business did not become
severe. The leading turning points of the money series also support
the independence of its effects, since business activity can be expected
to reflect and to recover from a drastic monetary deflation only after
a lag.
Conceivably, one might attribute the entire decline in the money
stock in 1929—33 to the contraction in activity (the two in that instance
largely coincided) and argue that the suspension of payments by banks,
which came at the end of the contraction, was not an independent
development, as in other panics, but reflected the pressures of the
prolonged deflation on the banking system. But we should not con-
clude even then that the monetary decline had little effect on business.
If all severe cycles are considered together, the sharp declines in
monetary growth occurred for a variety of reasons and cannot all be
attributed to the severity of the accompanying business contractions.
If the monetary decline was important in some, it was surely important
in all. The consistent behavior of money in all severe depressions is
too strong to be ignored. The widespread tendency, following the
1930's, to neglect the influence of money was too sweeping.
One can, of course, imagine various nonmonetary factors that
might make a business decline severe and not at the same time produce
a sharp drop in monetary growth. That has not happened in theSUMMARY 297
period examined, and there is considerable justification for the view
that sharp declines in monetary growth are not only an important
contributor to severe depressions but are also responsible for them.
If that is true, such calamities can be avoided so long as large declines
in monetary growth do not occur—which is within the realm of
possibility through prevention of panics and sharp declines in high-
powered money.
In relation to mild business cycles, the rate of change in the money
stock may be viewed as having an inverted pattern with lagging turns,
peaks in monetary growth corresponding to business troughs, and
troughs corresponding to business peaks. An inverted pattern is not
the only interpretation of the fluctuations in monetary growth, how-
ever. The fluctuations may also be viewed as conforming positively
to business cycles with a high correlation of amplitudes and a timing
lead at turning points, peaks in monetary growth corresponding to
business peaks occurring a quarter or more of a cycle later, and sim-
ilarly for troughs. The conformity appears strong on either a positive
or inverted comparison, which suggests a two-way relationship between
money and business. By this interpretation, the inverted conformity
reflects the influence of business, acting through the three deter-
minants, on money; and the positive leading conformity reflects the
lagged effects of money on business.Indeed, the timing relations
show less variability when the money series is viewed positively rather
than invertedly, suggesting that the positive conformity is not simply a
reflection of an inverted pattern.
If large changes in the money stock produce a substantial decline
in business activity, they must also have some effect in mild business
cycles;the only question is one of their relative importance. De-
pendence of the cycles in money on business activity does not rule out
the reverse effects of money on business, but a high covariation between
them is no proof of the importance of monetary effects. The analysis
in this study provides some indirect evidence, however, that even
moderate variations in the rate of change in the money stock are
important. The evidence is the persistence of their correspondence to
mild business cycles, particularly the largely unaltered timing, over
a long period. Some alteration in timing would be expected if this
relation ran solely from business to money, but not if it ran the opposite
way.Since 1875, far-reaching developments have transformed our
financial institutions and markets, as shown by differing relative298 SUMMARY
contributions over time of the reserve ratio and high-powered money
to cycles in the money stock, and by changes in the degree of inter-
dependence among the determinants. Yet, in the face of these develop-
ments, the relation between the rate of monetary growth and business
cycles has remained the same. We are apparently dealing not with
many unrelated periods since 1875 but basically with one, differentiated
by changes in monetary institutions which affected mainly the sources
of variation.
Casual impressions may be a particularly poor guide to the over-all
importance of money in business cycles, because its effects apparently
occur with lags. Both theoretical and empirical studies point to lags,
though exactly how long they are remains in dispute.It is easy to
overlook factors that take hold slowly and without fanfare, and to
overstress those that have a quick and dramatic impact, though the
cumulative effect of the former may be vastly more important. The
widely raised objections to the effectiveness of monetary policies—
based in part on the alleged insensitivity of investment expenditures
to changes in the supply of loanabk funds and interest rates—really
argue that monetary effects involve lags, not that they never occur.
Lags do not necessarily or typically make an effect, once it occurs,
weaker. Our analysis does not establish clearly whether or not mone-
tary effects are important in mild cycles; but if they are, a lag, to-
gether with the reciprocal dependence of money on business activity,
supplies all the necessary ingredients for a self-generating cyclical
process.
The reduction of all business cycles to one process is obviously
unrealistic, since it omits the interplay of many other economic vari-
ables that are involved in actual cycles.Other related processes
undoubtedly occur and, so far as the limited evidence presented
goes, may do so with more or less relative importance. Although
the variety of cyclical experience warns against preconceived and over-
simplified formulations, much of the seeming complexity of cycles may
reflect our failure to include all the vital parts.If one vital part is
described even roughly by a monetary process, models of a "real"
cycle, which try to explain aggregate expenditures without reference
to monetary factors, lack an essential element. By our results, the
transmission of fluctuations in spending and output to and from the
banking system merits close attention in business cycle research.